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ATrORNEYS' FEES
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, attorneys' fees are not awarded to the prevail-
ing party unless a contractual agreement, a statute, or procedural rule
provides otherwise.' The English Rule, on the other hand, provides that
the loser pays both his costs and those of the successful litigant.2 The
American approach has garnered support and endured criticism;
throughout time, numerous exceptions to the rule have evolved.'
This survey examines recent Tenth Circuit decisions concerning
attorneys' fees.' Part I provides a brief history of the English Rule. Part I
also details the background of the American Rule, including justifica-
tions, criticisms, and exceptions to the rule. Parts II and III explore two
Tenth Circuit cases awarding attorneys' fees in which one party acted in
bad faith.! Part IV explores choice-of-law problems in the context of a
recent Tenth Circuit case.6
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
In the English system the losing party pays his own fees, and in ad-
dition pays the fees of the prevailing litigant.! Historically, English courts
have either awarded fees based on statutory guidelines or on a discre-
tionary basis.8 The Statute of Gloucester, enacted in 1275,' was the first
to provide attorneys' fees, establishing that "whereas before time Dam-
ages were not taxed, but to the Value of the Issues of the Land; it is pro-
vided, that the Demandant may recover against the Tenant the Costs of
1. Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383, 1390 (Colo. 1989).
2. See generally Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929) (providing a history of
the manner in which costs are awarded in the English system).
3. See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1578-93 (1993).
4. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
5. Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc., 111 F.3d 758 (10th Cir. 1997); Martinez v. Roscoe, 100
F.3d 121 (10th Cir. 1996).
6. During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit also addressed attorneys' fees and tax retums.
See Dye v. United States, 121 F.3d 1399 (10th Cir. 1997). In Dye, the court considered the charac-
terization of attorneys' fees. The Tenth Circuit determined that these fees could be described as
either capital gains or ordinary expenses on a tax return. Id. at 1411. However, the Tenth Circuit
declined to determine the method of allocating the attorney fees in connection with these claims. Id.
Although the court rejected the methods utilized by other appellate courts, the Tenth Circuit did not
establish a method of allocation. Id. Finally, the court remanded the case for a determination of
allocation. Id.
7. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1569. The English Rule is sometimes called the "loser pays"
rule. Id. In England, the term "costs" applies to fees paid to the court, to the solicitor, to counsel,
expenses of witnesses, and all other necessary expenses. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 856-59.
8. Vargo, supra note 3, at 1570-71.
9. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 852 (citing Statute of Gloucester 6 Edw. I c. 1 (1275)).
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his Writ purchased, together with the Damages abovesaid.""' Courts con-
strued this statute liberally and extended the doctrine to cover the legal
costs of the parties."
The law awarding costs to a prevailing defendant in a lawsuit
evolved at a slower pace. 2 Initially, seeing a plaintiff fail in his case was
considered rewarding enough for a successful defendant. 3 In 1531, Eng-
land established a statutory provision awarding a prevailing defendant
costs in certain suits." Finally, in 1607, new legislation allowed a defen-
dant to recover costs in all kinds of suits when he prevailed.'5
In 1875, the English modified their statutory system significantly'6
so that judges could use their discretion in awarding costs. Although the
English have amended and expanded these rules, they are still in effect
today.'8 In addition, the British judiciary recently devised a taxing system
with which courts calculate the attorneys' fees a party must pay. 9 In this
system the prevailing party's attorney must prepare a detailed list of the
taxable expenses.' If the losing party agrees he pays the costs;2' when the
loser disagrees with the winner's calculations, both the plaintiff and de-
fendant present their lists to a taxing master who determines the correct
amount.n
The early American colonies rejected the English Rule.' Some
commentators believe that frontier individualism and the notion of "the
solitary folk-hero fighting for his rights" led to the development of the
American Rule.2 ' After the Revolution, a general resentment for the Eng-
lish fueled the colonists' rejection of the English legal models.' One
commentator argues, however, that an inadvertent error actually led to
the rejection of the English Rule.' In 1848, the New York legislature
fixed the amount of attorneys' fees one could recover in actual amounts,
10. Id.
I1. Id.
12. Id. at 853.
13. Id.
14. Id. (citing 23 Hen. VIII c. 15 (1531)). Costs were available only in certain cases, including
those for trespass, case, debt, contract covenant, and account actions.
15. Id. (citing 4 Jac. I c. 3 (1607)).
16. Id. at 854 (citing Supreme Court of Judicature Acts, 38 & 39 Vict c.77 (1975)).
17. See id.
18. id.




23. See John V. Tunney, Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636,640 (1974).
24. Id. at 641.
25. Id.




rather than by percentage of the amount recovered.' These amounts, con-
sidered nominal, were never adjusted." "[Lilt was this process of gradual
forgetting rather than a deep-seated moral argument that has apparently
caused the abolition of the prevailing party's right to the recovery of his
counsel fees."
Rather than ordering the loser to pay both parties' costs, the Su-
preme Court adopted the American Rule in 1796.30 The rule stated that
"absent a specific, contractual, statutory, or procedural rule providing
otherwise," a prevailing party was not entitled to an award of attorneys'
fees." In such a case, each party must pay their own attorneys' fees.32
The American Rule reflected the colonists' suspicion of lawyers.
Members of the ruling class were reportedly jealous of attorneys' stand-
ing in the community."' In some colonies attorneys were forbidden to
charge any fee.3" Colonists believed the law was straightforward, and
therefore, they considered lawyers unnecessary.'
Individual colonies enacted statutes in an effort to formalize the
regulation of attorneys' fees.37 Some colonies set attorneys' fees at a spe-
cific level, while others created fee schedules. In Virginia the maximum
an attorney could receive was fifteen shillings, or one hundred pounds of
tobacco.39 Other colonies set the amount an attorney could receive ac-
cording to the service performed, for example an attorney could charge
per line of typing in a document submitted on behalf of the client.' It was
27. Id. at 799.
28. Id.
*29. Id. On the other hand, Professor Luebsdorf argued that the New York legislature was
aware that the award of fees was small compared to actual fees, and deliberately declined to increase
the amount available. See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10 (1984).
30. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
31. Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1283, 1390 (Colo. 1989).
32. Id.
33. Tunney, supra note 23, at 640-41.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. Over time, however, lawyers gained more respect, and by the eighteenth century, many
people hired attorneys to represent them.
37. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1572.
38. Id. New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina and New Hampshire set fees and
cost recovery fees at the same level. Id.
39. Charles T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of
Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 620 (1931).
40. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1573; see also Goodhart, supra note 2, at 873-74. A New York
statute established the following fee schedule:
Retaining fee, three dollars and seventy-five cents, to one counsel only;
Perusing, amending, and signing every petition of appeal, and every answer to a petition
of appeal, two dollars and fifty cents;
Perusing and amending every other petition to the court, in a case where an appeal is
pending, or in which a writ of error shall have been brought, one dollar and twenty-five
cents;
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unclear whether these fixed amounts represented the maximum an attor-
ney could charge, or whether lawyers could charge more through a pri-
vate contract with the client." In addition, some colonies established an
amount for a specific type of case, but reduced the amount if the parties
entered into an out-of-court settlement.'
Following the Revolution, some states established schemes in which
the prevailing litigant collected attorneys' fees. 3 This scheme, though
similar to the English system, differed in that it did not consider complex
taxation schemes addressed by the English. This left the prevailing
American litigants to receive less in recovery than they might if they
prevailed in England."
Throughout the laissez faire era, attorneys contracted for their serv-
ices in an effort to set their own charging scheme.5 Contracting for serv-
ices outside of the legislatively-established fee schedules influenced the
establishment of the American Rule. ' In 1789, Congress authorized fed-
eral courts to follow state law concerning fee awards." Later, the Su-
preme Court set forth the American Rule in a case in admiralty."
The 1789 Act and legislation expired by 1800, but Congress did not
adopt other provisions related to attorneys' fees until 1853.'9 During the
time between 1800 and 1853, federal courts examined state law to de-
termine attorneys' fee issues.' Because different states had passed differ-
ent types of legislation, the federal courts took an inconsistent approach
to attorneys' fees.' Eventually, Congress passed the 1853 fee bill"2 al-
Perusing, amending and settling every special pleading, entry or order, one dollar and
fifty cents;
Attending the court to make or oppose a motion, or to present or oppose a petition, one
dollar and twenty-five cents;
Arguing every special motion or petition, two dollars and fifty cents;
Arguing every cause, or attending for such argument pursuant to notice, three dollars and
seventy-five cents;
But the foregoing fees shall be allowed only to one counsel on each side who shall have
been actually employed and rendered the service charged.
Goodhart, supra note 2, at at 874.
41. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1573.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1573-74.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1575.
46. Id.
47. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93, 93-94 (repealed 1792); see also Vargo, supra note
3, at 1576.
48. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
49. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1576.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1577; Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161, 161-62 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1923(a) (1994)). The text as codified reads:




lowing a party to collect docket fees up to twenty dollars. 3 This fee bill is
still in effect today and provides that "absent either statutory or judicial
exception, the winning party in litigation can recover only the twenty-
dollar docket fee." 4
Legal commentators offer several justifications for the American
Rule. If a potential litigant thought she might have to pay the opposing
counsels' fees if she lost, she may be discouraged from initiating a law-
suit."5 Unable to afford the risk of paying the other party's attorneys' fees,
she may elect not to sue, and consequently never have her day in court.
This could have a chilling effect on those unable to pay, and may deter
parties from bringing meritorious lawsuits.' Others support the American
Rule because attorneys' fees are not considered foreseeable. 7 Unless
damages are foreseeable, a person cannot be held liable for those costs."
If not foreseeable, those fees are not recoverable as damages. 9 In addi-
tion, the time and expense of assessing attorneys' fees may be burden-
some for the judicial system.'
Despite these justifications, many oppose the American Rule, in-
stead preferring the English System."' Critics argue that under the Ameri-
can Rule, people are actually encouraged to bring frivolous suits because
no matter the outcome, parties only pay their own costs.' More specifi-
cally, a person would have no incentive to suspend a frivolous suit When
$20 on trial or final hearing (including a default judgment whether entered by the
court or by the clerk) in civil, criminal, or admiralty cases, except that in cases of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction where the libellant recovers less than $50 the proctor's
docket fee shall be $10;
$20 in admiralty appeals involving not over $1,000;
$50 in admiralty appeals involving not over $5,000;
$100 in admiralty appeals involving more than $5,000;
$5 on discontinuance of a civil action;
$5 on motion for judgment and other proceedings on recognizances;
$2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence.
(b) The docket fees of United States attorneys and United States trustees shall be paid to
the clerk of court and by him paid into the Treasury.
(c) In admiralty appeals the court may allow as costs for printing the briefs of the suc-
cessful party not more than: $25 where the amount involved is not over $1,000;
$50 where the amount involved is not over $5,000;
$75 where the amount involved is over $5,000.
28 U.S.C. § 1923(a).
53. Vargo, supra note 3, at 1578.
54. Id.
55. M. Isabel Medina, Comment, Award of Attorney Fees in Bad Faith Breaches of Contract
in Louisiana-An Argument Against the American Rule, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1173, 1178 (1987).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1177.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1176-77.
60. Id. The author noted, however, that this argument ignores prescribed fee schedules for
determining attorneys' fees. Id. at 1203 n.30.
61. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1590-91.
62. Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV.
75,78 (1964).
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all the party is required to pay are his own costs.' The English system, on
the other hand, operates to deter these suits because the litigant risks
payment of both parties' costs."
Others argue that a winner can never be made whole unless he can
collect attorneys' fees.' When a person prevails in a lawsuit, she should
not be penalized by having to pay her attorneys' fees.' In addition, many
consider that a prevailing party should be reimbursed for her attorneys'
fees because in bringing her successful lawsuit she has acted as a "pri-
vate attorney general." As a private attorney general, the prevailing
party provides a "socially beneficial" advantage to the public by bringing
the suit, or by defending her position.' Critics of the American Rule ar-
gue, however, that a person should not have to bear the costs if the law-
suit benefits public interest.'
Perhaps due to the weaknesses of the American Rule, exceptions
developed quickly in American jurisprudence."0 Parties in a contract may
provide that if a dispute arises from that contract, one of the parties has
to pay the other's attorneys' fees." The "common fund" exception pro-
tects named litigants in class action lawsuits from bearing the costs of the
lawsuit." When funds have been set aside to benefit entities rather than
the individual litigants, a court may dip into this fund when the court has
control over the fund, and the fund beneficiaries are identifiable. This
exception is applied in commercial litigation, mass disaster lawsuits, and
other class action suits." The "substantial benefit" exception is similar,
but applies to nonpecuniary benefits, including for example, the en-
forcement of a statute. Finally, when a party enforces a final order
through a contempt proceeding, he can collect those attorneys' fees for
the enforcement of the contempt order.
63. Id.
64. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1591.
65. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1994)
(recognizing that winning litigants may not be made whole when forced to pay their own costs).
66. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1591.
67. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662; see John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the
Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) (discussing the
private attorney general rationale).
68. Rowe, supra note 67, at 663.
69. Id.
70. Vargo, supra note 3, at 1578-93 (discussing the various exceptions).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Enterprise Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240,
248 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (discussing awards of attorneys' fees in commercial litigation in which law-
yers recovered for the benefit of a class).
73. Vargo, supra note 3, at 1581.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1580 (stating that nonparties should help to bear the cost of the lawsuit).
76. Id. at 1583.
[Vol. 75:3
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In addition, Congress established exceptions to the American Rule
through legislation." In response to an increasing amount of litigation,
Congress enacted statutes penalizing parties for bringing a groundless,
vexatious, or frivolous lawsuit. 8 Furthermore, under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, if an attorney signs a pleading that he knows is not
grounded in either fact or law, a court may impose sanctions against the
lawyer." These statutes are characterized as punitive because they penal-
ize either the parties or attorneys for acting in bad faith.' ° Many statutes
allow an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing litigant despite the
absence of bad faith or vexatious actions.' These statutes assist individu-
als in bringing claims that they not would otherwise have the opportunity
to litigate because of an inability to bear the costs." These are described
as incentive statutes. Because the American Rule is riddled with excep-
tions, coupled with many state and federal statutes allowing fee shifting,
many issues surrounding attorneys' fees remain unresolved.
II. BAD FArrH CONDUCT AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. Background
Recognizing that courts are susceptible to parties' abuse of the liti-
gation process, courts have embraced and expanded upon exceptions to
the American Rule.' In 1993, the Supreme Court established that a party
seeking to enforce a final judgment through a contempt action could
collect attorneys' fees for the enforcement in Toledo Scale Co. v. Com-
77. See Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American
Rule?, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321 (1984) (discussing the extent of fee shifting legislation
among the states and by Congress).
78. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-e (1994) (The Miller Act). There are many other statutes that
authorize such an award. An example of a state statute providing fee shifting appears in Colorado
law:
The general assembly recognizes that courts of record of this state have become increas-
ingly burdened with litigation which is straining the judicial system and interfering with
the effective administration of civil justice. In response to this problem, the general as-
sembly hereby sets forth provisions for the recovery of attorney fees in courts of record
when the bringing or defense of an action, or part thereof (including any claim for exem-
plary damages), is determined to have been substantially frivolous, substantially ground-
less, or substantially vexatious. All courts shall liberally construe the provisions of this
article to effectuate substantial justice and comply with the intent set forth in this section.
COLD. REV. STAT. § 13-17-101 (1997).
79. FED. R. Cv. P. 11.
80. See also Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61
N.C. L. REV. 613 (1983).
81. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1994) (Equal Access to Justice Act); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)
(1994) (ERISA); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994) (Civil Rights Statute); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1994)
(FOIA); 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3) (1994) (International Child Abduction Act).
82. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1588.
83. See generally Goodloe Partee, Note, Procedure-Sanctions--Federal Procedural Rules
Do Not Displace Inherent Powers of Court to Award to Award Attorney's Fees for Bad Faith Con-
duct, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2123 (1991), 14 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 107 (1991)
(discussing a Supreme Court case to illustrate the general acceptance of the bad faith exception).
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puting Scale Co.9" In Toledo Scale, the Court noted that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it "impose[d] as a penalty, compensation
for the expenses incurred by the successful party to the decree in de-
fending its rights in the [trial] court."'s While other courts have expanded
on this general proposition, fee shifting in enforcement proceedings re-
mains a recognized exception to the American Rule.9'
Similarly, courts embraced the exception of fee shifting in cases
where bad faith conduct has occurred. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the
Supreme Court reviewed the bad faith exception to the American Rule.
Chambers entered into a purchase agreement with NASCO to sell his
television station facility and broadcast license for $18 million. ' After
the parties entered into the agreement, Chambers expressed his desire to
terminate the agreement. 9 He informed NASCO, the buyer, that he
would not file the necessary papers with the Federal Communications
Commission, and in response the buyer initiated a suit for specific per-
formance.' To protect the radio station, the seller and his attorney trans-
ferred the station to the seller's sister through a trust.9' Neither Chambers
or his attorney informed the court until the trust documents were signed
despite the judge specifically questioning the attorney about the possibil-
ity of a transfer to a third party.' Ignoring warnings about their unethical
conduct, Chambers and his attorney continued to abuse the judicial proc-
ess.
93
Eventually the case evolved into one addressing a federal court's
power to award attorney's fees when one party has acted in bad faith.'
The Supreme Court reiterated that courts have broad discretion to impose
sanctions on parties, and articulated that the purpose of the bad faith ex-
ception included policing the parties, and the court." Determining that
the district court sanctioned Chambers for the fraud perpetrated on the
84. 261 U.S. 399 (1923).
85. Toledo Scale, 261 U.S. at 428.
86. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1583 (discussing three cases which expanded this general
rule); see also Sheila's Shine Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 485 F.2d 114, 130-31 (5th Cir. 1973)
(allowing an award of discovery expenses where party incurred costs in determining whether the
other party acted in contempt); Crane v. Gas Screw Happy Pappy, 367 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1966)
(awarding fees to a party based on the other party's defiance of prior court orders); In re Fed. Sky-
walk Cases, 97 F.R.D. 370, 378 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (awarding fees when one party made ex parte
communications with plaintiffs in violation of disciplinary rules).
87. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
88. Id. at 35-36.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 36.
91. Id. at 36-37.
92. Id. at 37-39.
93. Id. at 38-39. Chambers denied the validity of a preliminary injuction issued by the trial
court, filed meritless motions and refused to close the sale, even when ordered by the court. Id. The
judge warned Chambers and his attorney many times throughout this process. Id.
94. Id. at 42.
95. Id. at 46.
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court, and not for the breach of contract, the Supreme Court affirmed the
sanction and the award of attorneys' fees to NASCO.' The Court, how-
ever, expressly declined to reach the issue of sanctioning purely preliti-
gation bad faith.'
B. Martinez v. Roscoe"
1. Facts
In 1993, the district court issued an injunction prohibiting the de-
fendants, who were owners of an apartment complex, from engaging in
certain activities not specified by the court." Two years later, the plain-
tiffs, tenants in the same apartment complex, sought to enforce this in-
junction after the defendants failed to comply with the order." Not only
did the court find that the defendants violated the order, but the court
issued another injunction and awarded the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees."°
The defendants appealed the case to the Tenth Circuit, requesting
reconsideration of the attorneys' fee award. Specifically, the defendants
argued that the court erred in awarding the plaintiffs attorney's fees
based on the defendants' bad faith. °m The defendants asserted that pun-
ishment for violation of the court order should have been addressed in a
contempt proceeding, rather than through the bad faith exception to at-
torneys' fees." In the alternative, the defendants argued the court should
not have awarded attorneys' fees when the legal services were provided
by a publicly-funded legal aid program.'
2. Decision
The court disposed of both arguments with only minor discussion.
After determining that the lower court's findings were not clearly erro-
96. Id. at 54. The Court expressly declined to explore whether bad faith prior to the initiation
of litigation should be considered. Id. at 54 n.16. The dissenting justices would have refused to
extend the bad faith exception to prelitigation behavior. Id. at 59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dis-
sent, Scalia explored the bad faith exception and other inherent powers of the judiciary. Id. (Scalia,
J., dissenting). He stressed, however, that the court's inherent conduct should not "'reach beyond the
court's confines' that does not 'interfere] with the conduct of trial."' Id. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798 (1987)). Justice
Kennedy also wrote a dissenting opinion. id. at 60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy asserted that
the majority opinion could be read to extend to prelitigation conduct, and opposed such an extension.
Id. at 74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He agreed that sanctioning prelitigation bad faith exceeded the
bad faith exception. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 72.
98. 100 F.3d 121 (1OthCir. 1996).
99. Martinez, 100 F.3d at 122.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 123.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 124.
105. Id. at 123-24.
19981
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neous, the court addressed the contempt argument." The court stated,
"we are not impressed with defendants' argument that they may be pun-
ished in a separate contempt proceeding for the same conduct punished
here. This claim of some possible future unspecified detriment is too
speculative for our consideration.""
The court found there was not sufficient evidence to address the is-
sue of reasonableness of the award.'" Finally, the court considered the
award for services provided through legal aid."° The purpose of awarding
attorneys' fees, the court asserted, is to sanction the party who acted in
bad faith. ' Therefore, the court construed "no reason to distinguish be-
tween attorneys who are paid by a party and attorneys who are paid with
public funds.'".
C. Analysis
Surprisingly, the court did not appear to consider addressing possi-
ble issues of res judicata."2 For example, if the plaintiff filed a separate
contempt proceeding, under the historical exception relating to contempt
proceedings, a court could award attorneys' fees."3 On the other hand, the
court in Martinez specifically articulated the reasons for awarding attor-
neys' fees--to punish the defendant for acting in bad faith. Therefore, if
106. Id.
107. Id. at 123-24.
108. Id. at 124. The defendants argued that the fees were unreasonable. Id. However, it appears
that they made only generalized statements regarding the award and did not present any evidence. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
11l. Id. The court held in accord with several other courts, which have upheld the fees award to
publicly-funded programs. Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1984) (awarding
attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to private nonprofit legal services organization); New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 70 n.9 (1980) (awarding attorneys' fees to public
interest legal services provider in Title VII action); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244-46 (3d
Cir. 1977) (awarding attorneys' fees to nonprofit, federally-funded legal services provider in
ADEA); Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1976) (recognizing that Congress placed no limit
on amount payable to publicly-funded organization under a federal statute which provided for award
of fees in voting rights case)).
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). This statute provides one articulation of the rule:
The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States,
or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or
Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or
Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of
the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that
the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territo-
ries and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.
Id.
113. See Vargo, supra note 3, at 1583.
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there were a separate contempt order, it is unlikely the defendants would
be punished for the same behavior under the res judicata doctrine. Fur-
thermore, the parties might never pursue a contempt proceeding, and the
defendants' action might go unpunished.""
The purpose behind the bad faith exception remains punishment of a
party for bringing a frivolous lawsuit."' As the Tenth Circuit determined,
it is irrelevant that a legal aid attorney represented the prevailing party,
though some may argue that the prevailing party is unjustly enriched.
The support for the Tenth Circuit's determination was not very persua-
sive, however, and could easily be distinguished from previous case law.
Namely, this case involved a judicially-created exception to the Ameri-
can Rule, rather than a statute specifically authorizing fee shifting. The
court did punish bad faith behavior, however, and this result operates to
justify the extension of the bad faith exception.
III. MILLER AcT AND BAD FAITH
A. Background
In 1935, Congress enacted the Miller Act to meet the concerns of
individuals who were subcontractors on projects for the United States."'
Congress addressed the subcontractors' concerns that there was no guar-
antee of payment because they were not in privity of contract with the
United States by requiring contractors to furnish a bond to their subcon-
tractors for jobs over $2,000." '
Although the Miller Act does not expressly provide for attorneys'
fees, the Supreme Court established a bad faith exception to the Miller
114. SeeMartinezv. Roscoe, 100F.3d 121, 123 (10th Cir. 1996).
115. See, e.g., Medina, supra note 55, at 1197.
116. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-e (1986).
117. See Joseph E. Edwards, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Miller Act (40 U.S.C.A. §§ 270a-
270e) Litigation, 4 A.L.R. FED. 685 (1970). The Miller Act provides:
(a) Type of bonds required
Before any contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building
or public work of the United States is awarded to any person, such person shall furnish to
the United States the following bonds, which shall become binding upon the award of the
contract to such person, who is hereinafter designated as "contractor":
(1) A performance bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the officer awarding
such contract, and in such amount as he shall deem adequate, for the protection of the
United States.
(2) A payment bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to such officer for the pro-
tection of all persons supplying labor and material in the prosecution of the work pro-
vided for in said contract for the use of each such person. Whenever the total amount
payable by the terms of the contract shall be not more than $1,000,000 the said pay-
ment bond shall be in a sum of one-half the total amount payable by the terms of the
contract. Whenever the total amount payable by the terms of the contract shall be more
than $1,000,000 and not more than $5,000,000, the said payment bond shall be in a
sum of 40 per centur of the total amount payable by the terms of the contract. When-
ever the total amount payable by the terms of the contract shall be more than
$5,000,000 the said payment bond shall be in the sum of $2,500,000.
40 U.S.C. §§ 270a.
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Act in 1974."8 In F.D. Rich v. United States ex rel Industrial Lumber Co.,
a subcontractor agreed to supply plywood for several of the contractor's
projects."' After the contractor fell behind on several payments, the sub-
contractor initiated a Miller Act claim."2 The court of appeals held that if
state law allowed an award of attorneys' fees under the Miller Act so
should the federal court.'"' Because California allowed for attorneys' fees
in this type of case, the court awarded attorneys' fees.'"
The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's justification.'"
Examining the purpose of the Miller Act, the Supreme Court found that
the intent of the act was to protect subcontractors working for the gov-
ernment.'" The Court found that the Miller Act created a federal cause of
action, and therefore, the Court preferred to establish a uniform federal
rule rather than relying on state law.'" Unless the Court established a
uniform rule, the Court feared that subcontractors would not always be
compensated, even when their claim was successful.'" The Court also
noted that in Miller Act cases, construction can occur in more than one
state, causing confusion as to which state's law applies.' Finally, al-
though the Court recognized the bad faith exception to the American
Rule, the Court found that no bad faith occurred in F.D. Rich.'"
B. Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc.'"
1. Facts
Towerridge, a subcontractor, agreed to complete most of the asphalt
and concrete work for the prime contractor, T.A.O."0 While Towerridge
worked, the parties consistently disagreed as to whether the work was on
schedule, and which party was at fault for any delays.'' Due to these
disputes, Towerridge sought damages, claiming that money was due on
118. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974). The
Court inferred Congress' intent in establishing the Miller Act included the award of attorneys' fees
when bad faith occurred. Id. at 128. Without fee shifting, claimants under the Miller Act would
never be fully compensated. Id. They would always have to pay for legal representation. Id. The bad
faith exception would help eliminate that concern. Id.
119. Id. at 118.
120. Id. at 120.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 127.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 126-29
126. Id. at 128.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 129.
129. 111 F.3d758(1OthCir. 1997).




the contract.' The jury found in favor of Towerridge, and further found
that T.A.O. acted in bad faith. 3' Accordingly, the district court awarded
Towerridge attorneys' fees.'" On appeal, T.A.O. challenged the award of
attorney fees." T.A.O. argued that the court could not award attorneys'
fees for prelitigation bad faith."'
2. Decision
Initially, the court noted that the Miller Act allowed an award of
attorneys' fees, including awards for bad faith conduct.' The court ex-
amined the purpose and source of the bad faith exception to determine
whether the exception applied to prelitigation bad faith.'38 Finding that
the purpose was to punish abuses of the judicial process, the court deter-
mined that the Miller Act did not apply to prelitigation behavior.'39 The
court distinguished prelitigation behavior from behavior during judicial
proceedings, noting that "[b]ecause the origin of the bad-faith exception
is the federal judiciary's necessary and inherent power to police pro-
ceedings before it .... we find it unlikely that exception reaches to bad-
faith conduct not occurring during the course of the litigation itself."''
The court distinguished the claim before it from one in which there was
bad faith during prelitigation, along with bad faith during the litigation
itself.'" In such a case, courts are divided as to whether to consider the
prelitigation behavior."
Finally, the court clarified that it did not condone any of T.A.O.'s
behavior that resulted from bad faith."3 The court refused, however, to
extend the exception to the American Rule to include prelitigation con-
duct because to do so "risk[ed] swallowing of the Rule.... ."" The court
noted that to expand the exception so much "could open the door to fee
shifting in the ordinary tort or contract case" and therefore could go be-
yond its scope and purpose.'"
132. Id. at 762.
133. Id. at 760.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 765.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 766. The court examined a Supreme Court decision to determine the purpose of the
act. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). In that case, the Supreme Court did not
expressly decide this question, but alluded to what their decision would have been. See id. at 53. The
court also noted that in Chambers, the dissent shared the same view regarding prelitigation bad faith.
Towerridge, Ill F.3d at 766.
139. Towerridge, 111 F.3d at 766.
140. Id. at 766.
141. Id. at 767 n.6.
142. Id.
143. ld. at 769.
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61
N.C. L. REV. 613,634 (1983)).
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C. Other Circuits
Several other circuits have held in accordance with Towerridge.'"
The Fifth Circuit addressed the question of prelitigation bad faith in
Galveston County Navigation District No. 1 v. Hopson Towing Co."7 As
a result of the defendant's failure to open a drawbridge, a tug boat col-
lided with the bridge and subsequently sued the drawbridge operator."
The plaintiffs were awarded $20,000 in attorneys' fees.'' The trial court
based its attorneys' fees award on the defendant's refusal to pay damages
in an amount to which both parties stipulated, thereby causing the plain-
tiffs to incur attorneys' fees in an effort to recover those damages.'" The
Fifth Circuit held, however, that "[n]ot acting 'in an equitable manner'
was not grounds for an award of attorney's fees."1 While the defendants
may have acted in bad faith with regard to the underlying tort, there was
no evidence that the defendants acted in bad faith throughout the
lawsuit.'52 The Fifth Circuit distinguished this case from one in which a
party took a position maliciously, failed to comply with discovery re-
quests, or otherwise abused the litigation process."
In the Eighth Circuit, Lamb Engineering & Construction Co. v. Ne-
braska Public Power District'" clarified the issue of prelitigation bad
faith.'55 In Lamb, the court examined a contract between a public power
146. See Lamb Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 103 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir.
1997); Galveston County Navigation Dist. No. 1 v. Hopson Towing Co., 92 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.
1996); Association of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air Indus., Inc, 976 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1992) (en
banc); Woods v. Barnett Bank of Ft. Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004 (11 th Cir. 1985); Shimman v. Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 744 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir. 1984); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d
Cir. 1980).
147. 92 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 1996).
148. Hopson Towing, 92 F.3d at 354.
149. Id. at 355.
150. Id. at 359.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.; see also Association of Flight Attendants, 976 F.2d at 549-50 (finding no reason to
construe the exception broadly, the court limited the application of the bad faith exception to actions
occurring during the litigation itself); Woods, 765 F.2d at 1004 (holding that bad faith must occur in
the course of the litigation itself, because "[v]exatious conduct inherent in the fraudulent acts that
make up the ... cause of action cannot be the basis for an attorney's fee award because punitive
damages are not available. ... ); Shimman, 744 F.2d at 1226 (examining the rationale for the
American Rule, the Court stated that "[t]o allow an award of attorney fees based on bad faith in the
act underlying the substantive claim would not be consistent with the rationale behind the American
Rule..."); Nemeroff, 620 F.2d at 339 (implying that the bad faith exception only applies to litiga-
tion conduct by noting that claims must be without merit).
154. 103 F.3d 1422 (8th Cir. 1997).
155. Prior to this decision, the Eighth Circuit's decisions could be read to allow attorneys' fees
in the prelitigation context. See Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am., 530 F.2d 126 (8th
Cir. 1976) (1976) (agreeing with the district court that the defendant union acted in bad faith in




district and a contractor, Lamb, to refurbish electric lines." Lamb expe-
rienced difficulties in carrying out the contract.'" Eventually, the power
district terminated the contract, and Lamb brought action against the
public power district."
The district court expressly awarded attorneys' fees because of
prelitigation bad faith conduct."9 The Eighth Circuit concluded that an
award of prelitigation attorneys' fees was not in accord with Nebraska
law." After examining federal law, the Eighth Circuit also concluded
"that the district court's inherent power to award attorney fees as a sanc-
tion for bad faith conduct does not extend to pre-litigation conduct."'6'
Despite its holding, however, the court stated that prelitigation conduct
could be considered when examining attorneys' fees; however, prelitiga-
tion conduct alone could not be a basis for a fee award.'62
D. Analysis
In NASCO, the Supreme Court interpreted the bad faith exception
narrowly, prohibiting courts from sanctioning purely prelitigation bad
faith conduct. The Tenth Circuit has followed this approach accordingly.
The court left undecided, however, whether a court can consider preliti-
gation bad faith conduct when it is coupled with bad faith conduct during
the litigation itself.
The Eighth Circuit's approach addressed prelitigation bad faith.'6'
That court permitted consideration of prelitigation bad faith behavior
when awarding attorneys' fees for bad faith conduct during litigation."
This approach operates to eradicate bad faith, and allows courts to take
all the factors into account when sanctioning a party. Unless a court con-
siders prelitigation bad faith, a party could act in bad faith up to the filing
of a lawsuit with impunity. If this party also acted in bad faith during the
litigation, the party would only face sanctions for the litigation behavior
and not be punished for other bad faith conduct.
Those actions which could be considered prelitigation conduct are
extensive. For example, parties often discuss the possibility of initiating a
lawsuit. During this time, parties collect background information and
conduct research to assess whether litigation is a viable option. Negotia-
tion often occurs during this stage as well. Bad faith during this time
156. Lamb, 103 F.3d at 1427.
157. Id. The two parties have markedly different accounts concerning the breakdown of the
contract. See id. at 1427-28.
158. Id. at 1429.
159. Id. at 1434.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1437. The court distinguished Richardson, determining that certain acts of the union
were in the context of the litigation. Id. at 1436.
162. Id. at 1435.
163. See id. at 1422.
164. Id. at 1437.
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goes unpunished and courts will not even consider the behavior when
addressing bad faith awards.
Therefore, equity requires that courts be permitted to consider both
the prelitigation behavior and the litigation behavior when bad faith has
occurred throughout both stages. If one party does not comport with
good faith requirements during this crucial time, not only could unneces-
sary lawsuits be filed, but the other party might incur vast amounts of
fees during this phase. These fees would be a direct result of the other
party's bad faith. When this occurs the party who has acted in bad faith
should bear the costs associated with his bad faith conduct.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW AND ATrORNEY'S FEES
A. Background
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins,' federal courts sitting in diversity have generally applied fed-
eral procedural law and state substantive law. " No federal common law
exists and because common law generally governs substantive issues,
courts apply state law in those cases.'6" This result encourages uniformity
in both state substantive law and federal procedural law.'"
The Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society," caused confusion among lower federal courts in
situations when courts must determine which state law applies in a fee
shifting situation."0 Some commentators argued this confusion was a
result of unclear language in Alyeska.' ' In Alyeska's footnote 31, the
Supreme Court indicated that a federal court sitting in diversity should
apply state fee shifting laws, provided those laws reflect the policy of the
state.' Courts have interpreted that to mean they are always to apply
state fee shifting laws.7 Because some, though not all fee shifting laws
165. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
166. See Jeffrey A Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws: Further Sub-
stance/Procedure Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. PiTr. L. REV. 393, 394 (1988).
167. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
168. See Parness, supra note 166, at 394.
169. 421 U.S. 240 (1938).
170. See John G. Hanlin, Choice of Law in the Interpretation of Insurance and Reinsurance
Contracts, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15 (1991); Paness, supra note 166; Partee, supra note
83, at 107.
171. Parness, supra note 166, at393.
172. Aleyeska, 421 U.S. at 260 n.31. The Court stated:
A very different situation is presented when a federal court sits in a diversity case. '(I)n
an ordinary diversity case where the state law does not run counter to a valid federal stat-
ute or rule of court, and usually it will not, state law denying the right to attorney's fees
or giving a right thereto, which reflects a substantial policy of the state, should be fol-
lowed.'
Id.
173. Parness, supra note 166, at 414.
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are procedural, this interpretation is inconsistent with the language from
Erie which directed a federal court to use only federal procedural law."
Procedural fee shifting laws generally govern litigation conduct,
while substantive fee shifting laws relate to remedies available for spe-
cific claims.' This becomes relevant when attempting to harmonize Erie
and Alyeska.'"' For example, if a fee shifting law is considered proce-
dural, then under Erie, a court would use federal fee shifting laws.'" On
the other hand, when a fee shifting law is substantive, under Alyeska, a
court would apply the state's fee shifting law. 8 Under this analysis, at-
torneys' fees in the context of a contract would be substantive because
they relate to a remedy available from the specific contract claim, which
comprises the substantive claim. When courts apply only state fee shift-
ing laws, the language from Erie becomes moot.
In 1989, the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of which state's law a
court should use when sitting in diversity and determining attorneys'
fees.'" They decided this issue in a contract suit in Bill's Coal Co v.
Board of Public Utility.' ° After the parties reached a settlement agree-
ment, the purchaser filed for declaratory judgment as to nonliability in
the federal district court in Missouri.'8' Subsequently, the sellers filed a
breach of contract claim in an Oklahoma federal district court.'82 Eventu-
ally, the Oklahoma court transferred the sellers' action to the court in
Missouri, but the Missouri court transferred the actions back to Okla-
homa.'" After several procedural phases the case went before the Tenth
Circuit, which addressed which state's law was applicable to resolve the
issue of attorneys' fees.'"
Finding that attorneys' fees must be determined by state law and
that an award of attorney's fees was substantive, the Tenth Circuit court
applied Missouri law because the substantive law of that contract was
Missouri law.' 5 The Tenth Circuit determined that "[i]n diversity cases
generally, and certainly in this circuit, attorney fees are determined by
174. Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of Pub. Util., 887 F.2d 242 (1989).
175. Pamess, supra note 166, at 401.
176. Id at 402.
177. Id. at 414.
178. Id. at 411-12.
179. Bill's Coal, 887 F.2d at 245.
180. Id. at 242.
181. Id. at 243.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 245. The district court originally found that the sellers had breached the contract and
the case was dissolved. Id. at 249. However, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded that dissolu-
tion. Id. The district court, on remand, applied Missouri law with regard to attorneys' fees. Id. The
sellers appealed. Id.
185. Id. at 246.
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state law and are substantive for diversity purposes."'" The Tenth Circuit
did not, however, decide which state's choice-of-law rules to apply.87
Bill's Coal created some confusion regarding choice-of-law rules.
Courts agreed that attorneys' fees were substantive and the law that gov-
erned the contract should govern the underlying lawsuit. Courts were
unclear, however, which state's choice-of-law rules should be applied in
the first instance.
B. Boyd Rosene and Associates, Inc. v. Kansas Municipal Gas
Agency '
1. Facts
The defendants prevailed on an appeal from a district court ruling.'"9
The defendants sought attorneys' fees as prevailing parties, pursuant to
an Oklahoma statute, but the district court ruled that each party must bear
their own costs.'9 The defendants then sought en banc consideration of
which state's law should apply to determine an award of attorneys'
fees. '9 The lower courts agreed that attorneys' fees were substantive and
that Missouri law governed the parties' contract.' The issue before the
Tenth Circuit, however, required the court to determine which state's
choice-of-law rules applied: Missouri or Oklahoma.' 3
2. Decision
The court asserted, as in Bill's Coal, that attorneys' fees were sub-
stantive for diversity purposes, therefore, courts must apply the substan-
tive law of the state which governs the contract.' However, the court
noted that generally in diversity cases, a federal court should apply the
substantive law of the forum state.'" Therefore, "[riather than automati-
cally applying the law of the state providing the substantive contract law,
a district court must first apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules in
resolving attorney's fees issues."' ' The court then remanded the case for
application of Oklahoma's choice-of-law rules.'9
186. Id. (quoting In Matter of King Resources Co., 651 F.2d 1349, 1353 (10th Cir. 1981)).
187. Id. at 243.
188. 123 F.3d 1351 (10th Cir. 1997).












In other jurisdictions, this area of the law appears to be settled.
Many courts reiterated the accepted notion that federal procedural rules
and state substantive rules govern in diversity cases.'" For example, in
Mentor Insurance Co. v. Brannkasse," the Second Circuit applied the
choice-of-law rules of the forum state, New York, that was determined
by an agreement of the parties." The court noted that under New York
law, parties may agree what law applies, and therefore the court did not
need to address the issue. °'
The Eighth Circuit also held that a federal court sitting in diversity
must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.' In that case, the
forum state generally recognized stipulations made by the parties in their
contract.' In addition, the First Circuit applied the forum's choice-of-
law principles in a contract suit to determine which state's substantive
law applied. ' In that case the trial court judge applied Massachusetts'
choice-of-law provisions to determine that Massachusetts law, rather
than California law, applied and the appellate court did not disturb this
finding.'
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit, in Heller International
Corp. v. Sharp' held that a district court sitting in diversity should have
applied the substantive law and the choice-of-law rules of the state in
which it sits.' In that case, however, the forum was Illinois, and because
the parties had already agreed that Illinois law governed, there was no
real choice-of-law question.'
D. Analysis
Choice-of-law rules are generally well settled coming from long
standing civil procedure cases such as Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.' Courts
apply federal procedural law and state substantive law. Due to ambiguity
created by Alyeska, however, courts have been perplexed as to how to
treat attorneys' fees because they can be considered as either procedural
198. For example, many courts cited Erie for the proposition that a federal court sitting in
diversity must apply the substantive law of the forum state, including choice-of-law principles. Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941).
199. 996 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1993).
200. Mentor lns., 996 F.2d at 513.
201. Id. at 513-14.
202. Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1366 (8th Cir. 1991).
203. Id.
204. Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 940 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1984).
205. Id. at 70.
206. 974 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1992).
207. Heller, 974 F.2d at 856.
208. Id.
209. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1998]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
or substantive issues, as evidenced by the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Bill's Coal.
The Tenth's Circuit approach is consistent with other state's efforts
to harmonize choice-of-law problems that arose from Erie and Alyeska.
This approach may, however, burden a court to apply the forum state's
choice-of-law provisions, and then another state's substantive law.
The Seventh Circuit's approach, which applied both the substantive
law and the choice-of-law rules from the forum state, is a possible alter-
native. While providing a bright line rule, this approach ignores the fact
that the substantive law of the forum state may differ from the substan-
tive law of the contract as in Boyd Rosene, which occurs often when par-
ties entered in to a contract with the intent that a certain state's law shall
govern. If a federal court were to only apply the forum state's law, the
intent of the parties to the contract would not realized.
Applying the forum state's choice-of-law rules in the first instance
serves two purposes. First, it gives the federal court state substantive law
with regard to choice-of-law rules. Second, it allows the substantive law
governing the contract to be applied to the contractual part of the dispute,
and generally, this law has been agreed upon by the parties.
CONCLUSION
The American Rule and its exceptions continues to evolve through-
out the United States. Many issues are left unresolved, but the Tenth Cir-
cuit appears to be in accord with the majority of jurisdictions. During the
survey period, the Tenth Circuit clarified important areas of the law, in-
cluding that the bad faith exception is applicable even if a party could be
punished through a contempt proceeding. However, the bad faith excep-
tion cannot be used to punish bad faith actions taken prior to the initia-
tion of litigation. In addition, the Tenth Circuit clarified choice-of-laws
analyses utilized to determine which state's fee shifting laws should ap-
ply in diversity cases.
Dana C. Schneider
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